Human Resources

Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective by Louis Phlips

By Louis Phlips

This booklet makes use of online game conception to investigate anti-competitive habit between businesses and to contemplate its implications for festival coverage. subject matters contain "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The publication discusses numerous ecu antitrust judgements and empirical stories intimately.

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Extra resources for Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

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Advance notification cannot be said to be bad as such. And information about prices should not, in principle, be considered more 'dangerous' than information about quantities, because quantity can be a strategic variable as well as price, especially for homogeneous goods. Are we to conclude that per se rules are to be avoided and that we should more carefully weigh the pros and cons in each case? I would hate such a conclusion, not only because it is no conclusion at all, but especially because it leaves business with no indication about what is legal and what is not.

When there is incomplete information about a parameter of the players' profit functions, for example uncertainty about the cost of production of individual cartel members, then a mechanism has to be designed that gives an incentive to truthfully reveal one's own cost to the others and provides for an efficient allocation of the production quotas of the members. 2. From a policy point of view, this chapter answers a fundamental question: in what sort of industries is explicit collusion likely to occur?

In the supply decision stage, each player / selects independently a supply quantity qt such that yf being the agreed quota when /joined a cartel. ) For firms that did not join a cartel, yf = oo since their supply is not restricted. Subgame perfect equilibrium is the solution concept, so that the game has to be solved backwards: First solve the supply decision subgame for given y = (y{,... ,yn) and Z; then solve the cartel bargaining subgame, for given Z, using the equilibrium supply decisions found for stage 3; finally, determine Z using all previous subgame equilibrium results.

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